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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT MOTORISTS
FOR SUITS ARISING FROM LOCAL ACCIDENTS.
By JAMES MoaRrr MULLEN*
The automobile presents one of the major problems of
today. It has been said that there are now on the streets
of Baltimore City ten thousand more automobiles than there
were a year ago. Any one familiar with the work of the
courts in Baltimore City knows that the law courts are
largely kept busy by litigation growing out of automobile
accidents. The criminal courts get a substantial amount
of work from appeals from the Traffic Court. On the other
hand, the equity courts have a minimum of litigation result-
ing from automobiles.
Any one with an impersonal interest in the work of the
courts would probably deprecate legislation which tends to
increase the work of the law courts in connection with auto-
mobiles. But whatever may be the merits of this abstract
proposition, it would seem very unfair for a non-resident
owner of an automobile to come into this State, cause an
accident herein, and still not be liable to suit in the courts
of the locality where the accident occurred. Legislation
was necessary to supply this lack in the law of this State,
because the Maryland Court of Appeals had decided1 that
when a non-resident came to Maryland for the purpose of
answering criminal proceedings growing out of the opera-
tion of an automobile within the State, he was immune from
civil process.
Maryland, like many other States, has enacted legisla-
tion to provide for local suits against non-resident owners
of automobiles for accidents occurring within this State.
There have been three such statutes passed.
The first statute2 was abortive because, though it was
modeled upon a valid statute of another State, it sought to
make an improvement therein which succeeded only in in-
validating the statute. The vitiating provision was that
* Of the Baltimore City bar. A.B., 1899, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1906, University of Maryland.
1 Feuster v. Redshaw, 157 Md. 302, 145 Atl. 560, 65 A. L. R. 1370 (1929).
2 Acts, 1929, Ch. 254.
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notice of any suit filed in this State was required to be given
by registered mail to the defendant, and that the address
to which such notice was sent was conclusively presumed to
be correct, if it were an address given by such defendant
in any proceeding at or subsequent to the accident involved,
or if the defendant's last address appeared upon the rec-
ords of the officials enforcing the Maryland Motor Vehicle
Law.
The present statute was enacted in 19318 and was
amended in 19331 to permit its provisions to apply to suits
brought before Justices of the Peace.
While the validity of the present legislation has never
been specifically sustained either by the Maryland Court
of Appeals or by the Supreme Court of the United States,
yet in view of the general characteristics necessary to the
constitutionality of such acts as determined by those Courts
there can be no question about the validity of the present
Maryland law. The present law has, however, been indi-
rectly approved by the Maryland Court of Appeals in two
cases concerning its effect, which are referred to below.
The gist of the present statute is that when the accident
occurs in this State for which it is claimed that a non-resi-
dent owner (unavailable to process in this State) is re-
sponsible, suit may be instituted in the local courts of this
State by the person affected. Service of process may be
had upon the Secretary of State, who is, by reason of the
use of the Maryland roads by the non-resident owner,
deemed to be the agent of such non-resident owner for ser-
vice of process. In addition, notice of the suit must be sent
by registered mail to the non-resident owner, and an af-
fidavit must be filed in the case showing that this require-
ment has been complied with. The statute provides the
form of notice to be sent to the non-resident owner.
The necessary requirements for the constitutionality of
such legislation have been clearly outlined by the Supreme
Court of the United States in two cases,5 and by the Mary-
Acts, 1931, Ch. 70.
'Acts, 1933, Ch. 288, Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Secs. 190-A, B.5 Hess v. Pawlowskl, 274 U. S. 352, 71 L. Ed. 1091, 47 B. Ct. 632 (1928);
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. Ed. 447, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928).
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land Court of Appeals in holding the Act of 1929 invalid.'
From these three cases, two essentials to the validity of
such legislation are clearly set out. One is that no personal
judgment can be entered in any court within a State ex-
cept where it is based upon the personal service of process
within the State either upon the defendant sought to be
sued, or upon his authorized representative. In Maryland,
as well as in other States, the legislation complies with this
requirement by specifying that the use of Maryland roads
is an inferential appointment of the Secretary of State as
the authorized representative within Maryland to accept
service of process for the non-resident automobile owner.
The second requirement is that in addition to the service
as above, sufficient notice must be given the defendant. In
Grote v. Rogers,1 this was described as follows:
"In determining the question as to the constitu-
tionality of the act, we must consider what may be done,
and not merely what has occurred, under its provi-
sions. . . . The test of its validity, as against the ob-
jections urged in this case, is the inquiry whether it
contains such requirements, with respect to the trans-
mission of the notice, as to make it reasonably probable
that the non-resident defendant will be informed of the
suit by which he is sought to be personally affected.
The concern and object of such a provision should be
actual notice to the defendant, and its prescribed course
of procedure should tend to insure that result. In our
opinion, the statute under discussion does not afford
such an assurance. It fails to meet the test of reason-
able probability that a compliance with its terms would
give the defendant actual knowledge of the suit, and it
is, therefore, invalid under the constitutional limita-
tion which has been invoked."
The 1929 Act was held invalid, because in an excess of
zeal the Maryland Legislature provided that the addresses
given by the defendant as above referred to should be con-
clusively. presumed to be correct, and, as the Court pointed
out in Grote v. Rogers, it could very well be that the ad-
dress given by the defendant at the time of the accident
Grote v. Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 AtI. 547 (1980),
Drid, 158 Md. 694, 695.
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might be correct, but he might have changed it before suit is
filed and it was not, therefore, reasonably probable that he
would receive actual notice of the suit.
The present statute, however, provides machinery
whereby it is reasonably probable that a non-resident de-
fendant will be informed of the suit, which is technically
sustained by personal service upon the Secretary of State.
In dealing with this type of legislation Mr. Justice But-
ler, in Hess v. Pawlowski, says the following in connection
with the Massachusetts statute there involved:
"Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and even
when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is
attended by serious dangers to persons and property.
In the public interest the state may make and enforce
regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on
the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who
use its highways. The measure in question operates
to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in
the state where arise causes of action alleged against
him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient
method by which he may sue to enforce his rights.
Under the statute the implied consent is limited to pro-
ceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on a
highway in which the non-resident may be involved.
It is required that he shall actually receive and receipt
for notice of the service and a copy of the process.""
It is interesting to note that while the Maryland statute
requires the plaintiff (or his attorney) to give notice by
registered mail to the non-resident defendant, and to file
in the case an affidavit showing compliance with this re-
quirement, in other States, the reasonable probability of
actual notice to the defendant is provided in other ways.
In Pennsylvania, the statute' requires that the process
be served upon the Secretary of Revenue, and the require-
ment of notice is merely that the Sheriff shall mail it to the
last known address of the defendant. He is not required
to send it even by registered mail, and under the test re-
ferred to above, this requirement affords a reasonable
probability that the defendant will in this manner be ap-
p274 U. S. 852 356, 71 L. Ed. 1091, 1094, 47 S. Ct. 632, 633 (1926).
I'urdon's Penna, Stat., Title 75, Sees, 1201-1206.
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prised of the suit. The Pennsylvania statute has been
held sufficient in a decision handed down in 1933 by a United
States District Court.10
Similarly, the Minnesota" and Wisconsin"2 statutes re-
quire the service of process to be served upon a State of-
ficial and the plaintiff is required to mail notice to the de-
fendant at his last known address. It is not necessary to
send by registered mail, or to show by the registry return
receipt, that the notice has actually been delivered. Both
of these statutes, together with a similar Connecticut stat-
ute, have been held valid."8
While there has been no specific decision either by the
Maryland Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the validity of the present Maryland law,
it has been twice before the Maryland Court of Appeals.
In the case of Wagner v. Scurlock,4 it was held that the
notice was properly given, but that in any event, the per-
sonal appearance of the defendant in the case waived any
possible insufficiency of the notice.
In the case of Employers' Liability Assurance Corpora-
tion v. Perkins,)5 there was a fuller discussion of the Act.
There was some discussion by Judge Parke of the require-
ments of the statute, and the specific decision was, that
where a notice is sent a non-resident defendant by regis-
tered mail, and it appears from the registry return receipt
that the notice was actually receipted for by the wife of the
non-resident defendant, this is a sufficient compliance with
the requirement of reasonable probability that the defend-
ant be notified, because the wife, by virtue of her marital
relation, has authority, where not disaffirmed, to sign the
registry return receipt.
In neither of the two cases was there any question
raised as to the validity of the present Maryland law, and
'
0 Carr v. Tennis, 4 Fed. Supp. 142 (D. Pa. 1933).
1 Mason's Minn. Stat., Sees. 2684-2688.
12Wisconsin Stat., Sec. 85.05 (3).
"8 Jones v. Paxton, 27 Fed. (2d) 364 (D. Minn. 1928) ; State v. Belden,
211 N. W. 916 (Wise. 1927) ; Hartley v. Vitlello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 At. 255
(1931). See also Vols. 15-16, Huddy, Ency. of Automobile Law, Sec. 82,
where the matter is discussed and all of the late authorities cited.14166 Md. 284, 170 Atl. 539 (1963).
15169 Md. 269, 181 AtI. 436 (1935).
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any discussion of the statute now in force in this State
would seem only to revolve around how far it is applicable.
One of the first questions is, who is liable to suit? The
Maryland statute is broad in that it provides for suit
against non-residents "while operating, or causing to be
operated automobiles within this State." This would,
therefore, provide for suit against the owner of the car,
when it was being operated by a chauffeur under authority
from the owner. In some States, however, the non-resident
statutes have a more limited application. In New York, for
instance, it has been decided 8 that where a car is being
operated by the defendant's chauffeur, there can be no suit
against the owner, as the New York statute is restricted to
actual operation by the owner.
The Maryland statute might, however, raise another
question. As it applies in its terms to "operating, or caus-
ing to be operated", a query is, therefore, suggested
whether under the Maryland statutes, where a non-resident
owner lends his car to another person, and the latter is on
his own business operating the car within the State of
Maryland, the non-resident owner can be sued in Maryland
under the present law. In other words, is the case of mere
permissive operation covered by the Maryland statutes?
The author ventures the suggestion that the answer to this
query is "No' .
The answer suggested by the author to the inquiry just
propounded pertains only to the procedural question of
whether under this law such a suit could be instituted in
Maryland; and it may be that this question is only academic
in view of the settled decisions by the Maryland Court of
Appeals holding for non-liability for mere permissive oper-
ation of a car, and rejecting what is generally known as the
"Family Car Doctrine".
So far, no question has arisen in this state as to the
effect of the Maryland statute when a non-resident owner is
charged with being responsible for an accident in the oper-
ation of his automobile on Maryland roads and dies before
16 O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624 (1930).
"7 Authorities for this point of jurisdiction are.cited in current annota-
tions to Huddy, Ency. of Automobile Law, Vols. 15-16, Sec. 85.
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suit can be filed. It has been held, however, by the courts
of other states that, in such event, the personal representa-
tive of the non-resident owner cannot be sued under the
statutes there in question.18
A recent decision by the United States District Court
of Maryland"0 involves an interesting point. One defend-
ant was the wife of a naval officer who, with her husband,
resided in Annapolis at the time of the alleged accident,
which occurred in Maryland, and for a year thereafter.
After this defendant removed her residence from Mary-
land, she was sued under the Maryland non-resident own-
er's law in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court. This
suit was removed to the Federal Court. A motion to quash
had been filed in the State court on the ground that the ser-
vice attempted to be had in Maryland could not lie in this
case where the person sued was a resident at the time of
the accident. Judge Chesnut held that it was not the inten-
tion of the statute to cover the case of a Maryland resident
who subsequently became a non-resident.
This decision is certainly in entire consonance with the
purposes of the act as hereinabove set out, to the effect that
a non-resident of Maryland, using the public highways of
Maryland, impliedly consents to the appoin~ment of the
Secretary of State as an agent to accept service of process.
There is no such implied appointment in the case of a
Maryland resident using Maryland roads.
This case also invites an interesting query to which we
believe there has been no answer in the Federal courts.
Can an original suit, when diversity of citizenship exists,
be brought in the Federal courts against a non-resident
under the provisions of this statute? A suggestion that
occurs is whether if a non-resident insurance company or
other corporation can be sued in the Maryland Federal
Court by service upon an agent resident in Maryland, and
appointed to accept service of process, is there an analogy
between this case and the implied appointment of the Secre-
tary of State of Maryland by the non-resident automobile
10 Buddy, Ency. of Automobile Law, Vols. 15-16, p. 152, current annota-
tions.
',3 Suit v. Shailer and Pickton, Daily Record, March 18, 1937.
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owner from the mere fact of the use of the Maryland public
roads? The author of this article does not venture to
answer this inquiry.
In discussing the extent of the operation of the Mary-
land statute, for prrposes of convenience the phrase "Non-
resident Owner" is used. The Maryland statute, however,
does not in terms apply simply to an owner operating his
own car, or causing it to be operated within the State of
Maryland. It broadly provides that the use of the roads
and highways of Maryland shall be deemed to be an ac-
ceptance of the provision of the Maryland law as to the
appointment of the Secretary of State as agent to accept
service of process in any suit growing out of an accident
in which such non-resident may be involved "while oper-
ating, or causing to be operated a motor vehicle" on the
Maryland highways.
The Maryland law makes no provision as to the venue
of suits filed under its provisions, and in the absence of
such a provision, it is submitted that a person suing in
Maryland for an accident in this State, involving a non-
resident motor vehicle owner, may proceed in any court in
the State which he may see fit to select. Certainly, this has
been the practice in proceeding under the Maryland
statute.
The Maryland law applies in its terms only to accidents
on the "public highways within the limits of this State".
So it would seem to follow that the act affords no redress
for accidents occurring on private roads, or elsewhere than
on public highways. Some interesting questions might
arise under this feature of the law.
The Act, of course, does not restrict its application to
resident plaintiffs, and accordingly its benefits are accorded
not only to residents of Maryland, who may be injured in
the operation of an automobile by a non-resident, but also
to residents of States other than Maryland who are simi-
larly damaged. There are authorities in other States to
the effect that non-residents have the same right to sue
under such statutes as is thereby given to residents.21
20 Huddy. loc. eit, supra note 18.
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Perhaps the length of time the Maryland statute has
been in force reduces to a moot question a discussion as to
whether or not the statute has any retroactive effect.
There have been conflicting decisions on this subject in the
courts of other States.2
On the whole, in view of the extreme mobility of auto-
mobiles, in spite of the fact that automobile litigation is
increased by this legislation, no one could question the
wisdom or justice of giving to Maryland residents the right
to bring suit in the courts of Maryland against non-resi-
dents claimed to be responsible for automobile accidents
occurring upon the public highways of Maryland.
While the author does not intend to be facetious in this
discussion, yet in view of the recent large growth in the use
of "trailers", and the custom of persons of moderate means
having their actual residence in "trailers", there might be
some practical difficulty in complying with the requirement
of the Maryland statute that notice be given to the non-
resident automobile owner by registered mail.
21 A discussion will be found in Huddy, Encyc. of Automobile Law, Vols.
15-16, pp. 153-155.
